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Waging a war to save biodiversity: the rise of militarized conservation 
Rosaleen Duffy, Department of Development Studies, SOAS, University of London 
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8176 words 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the rise in militarized approaches towards conservation, as part 
RI D QHZ µZDU IRU ELRGLYHUVLW\¶ 7KLV LV D NH\ GHILQLQJ PRPHQW LQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO
politics of conservation and needs further interrogation.  The claims that rhinos and 
elephants are under threat from highly organised criminal gangs of poachers shapes 
and determines conservation practice on the ground. This paper offers a critique of 
that argument, essentially by asking how we define poachers, and if militarized 
approaches mean conservationists are more willing to engage in coercive, repressive 
policies that are ultimately counterproductive.  Further, this paper examines how the 
new war for biodiversity is justified and promoted via reference to wider debates 
about intervention in a post-Cold War era; notably that the international community 
has a responsibility towards wildlife, especially endangered species, and that may 
require military forms of intervention to save them. 
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Introduction
1
 
Conserving biodiversity is a central environmental concern, and conservationists 
increasingly talk in terms of a war to save species.  International campaigns present a 
specific image: that parks agencies and conservation NGOs are engaged in a continual 
battle to protect wildlife from armies of highly organized criminal poachers who are 
financially motivated. The war to save biodiversity is presented as a legitimate war to 
save critically endangered species such as rhinos, tigers, gorillas and elephants. This 
is a significant shift in approach since the late 1990s, when Community Based Natural 
Resource Management (CBNRM) and participatory techniques were at their peak. 
Since the early ¶VWKHUHKDVEHHQDre-evaluation of a renewed interest in fortress 
conservation models to protect wildlife, including by military means.2 Yet, as 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Professor Dan Brockington (University of Manchester), Dr Bram Buscher (ISS), 
Dr Andy Newsham (SOAS), Jasper Humphreys (Kings College London) and an anonymous reviewer 
for their very helpful comments on previous drafts.  
2 Jon Hutton, Bill Adams and James C. Murombedzi, µ%DFN WR WKH EDUULHUV" &KDQJLQJ QDUUDWLYHV LQ
ELRGLYHUVLW\ FRQVHUYDWLRQ¶ Forum for Development Studies 32(2):  2005, pp.341±70; Daniel 
Brockington, Fortress conservation: The preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve Tanzania 
(Oxford: James Currey, 2002). 
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/XQVWUXPQRWHV WKHUH LV DGHDUWKRI UHVHDUFKRQ µJUHHQmilitarization¶DSURFHVVE\
which military approaches and values are increasingly embedded in conservation 
practice.3 
This paper examines the dangers of a war for biodiversity: notably that it is 
used to justify highly repressive and coercive policies.4 Militarized forms of anti-
poaching are increasingly justified by conservation NGOs keen to protect wildlife; 
these issues are even more important as conservationists turn to private military 
companies to protect and enforce protected areas. This paper firstly examines 
conceptual debates around the war for biodiversity; secondly it offers an analysis of 
current trends in militarized forms of anti-poaching; thirdly it offers a critical 
reflection on such approaches via an examination of the historical, economic, social 
and political creation of poaching as a mode of illegal behaviour; and finally, it traces 
how a militarized approach to anti-poaching developed out of the production of 
poaching as a category. 
 
The War for Biodiversity   
In theoretical terms, the debates around the relationships between environment and 
FRQIOLFWIRFXVRQWKHµHQYLURQPHQWDOVHFXULW\¶debate and not on conservation per se. 
Yet, a recent study in Conservation Biology concluded that over 90% of the major 
armed conflicts between 1950 and 2000 occurred within countries containing 
biodiversity hotspots, and more than 80% took place directly within hotspot areas.5 
Debates on war, violence and conflict are shifting, creating interesting intersections 
with conservation debates and practices. So we need to take up the challenge of 
thinking through the links with biodiversity conservation to move the debate forward 
from the current focus on population growth, deforestation, resource scarcity and 
climate change.6 
The debates around environmental security are most closely identified with the 
works of the Toronto Group and Thomas Homer-Dixon.7 The environmental security 
literature aims to establish whether there is a link between resources and conflict. 
They draw on a longer tradition of Malthusian understandings of environment-society 
interactions, which views violence as an outcome of natural resource scarcity, thereby 
DFWLQJDVDµQDWXUDOFKHFN¶RQSRSXODWLRQJURZWKIdeas of the environment as a source 
of conflict, or as a security threat also resonated with the redefinition of conflict in the 
post-&ROG :DU HUD DV µ1HZ :DUV¶,8 thinking through greed and grievance as 
                                                 
3 Elizabeth Lunstrum, µGreen Militarization: Anti-Poaching Efforts and the Spatial Contours of Kruger 
1DWLRQDO3DUN¶, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, forthcoming, 2014. 
4 Rosaleen Duffy, Nature FULPH+RZZH¶UHJHWWLQJFRQVHUYDWLRQZrong (New Haven, CT and London: 
Yale 8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV'DQLHO%URFNLQJWRQDQG-DPHV,JRHµ(YLFWLRQIRUFRQVHUYDWLRQ$JOREDO
RYHUYLHZ¶Conservation and Society, 4(3), 2006, pp.424±470. 
5 Thor Hanson, Thomas M. Brooks, Gustavo A. B. da Fonseca, Michael Hoffmann, John F. Lamoreux, 
*DU\0DFKOLV&ULVWLQD*0LWWHUPHLHU5XVVHOO$0LWWHUPHLHUDQG-RKQ'3LOJULPµ:DUIDUHLQ
biodiversity KRWVSRWV¶Conservation Biology 23: 3, 2009, pp. 578±87. 
6 For example see Ashok Swain, Understanding emerging security challenges: Threats and 
opportunities (London: Routledge, 2012); and Paul Rogers, Losing control: Global security in the 21st 
century (London: Pluto, 2010). 
7 Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environment, scarcity, and violence (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999); Robert Kaplan, µ7KH&RPLQJ$QDUFK\+RZ6Farcity, Crime, Overpopulation, 
Tribalism and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social FDEULFRI2XU3ODQHW¶, Atlantic Monthly, 1994 
http://www.TheAtlantic.com/atlantic/election/connection/foreign/anarcf.htm; Ian Bannon and Paul 
Collier (eds) Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (Washington D.C.: World 
Bank, 2003). 
8 Mary Kaldor, New and old wars: Organized violence in a global era (London: Polity, 2012). 
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motivators for conflict,9 and with critiques offered by Gleditsch and others.10 Litfin  
SRLQWVWRWKHDPELJXLW\LQWKHSKUDVHµHQYLURQPHQWDOVHFXULW\¶DQGXUJHVXVWRDVNZKR
and what are to be secured, does environmental security include questions about over 
FRQVXPSWLRQXQHYHQGHYHORSPHQWRUHYHQDERXWWKHQRWLRQRIµQDWXUH¶ itself?.11 It is 
critically important to the future success of conservation to understand how 
conservation affects and/or perpetrates conflict and violence. This is because these 
dynamics influence and determine conservation practice.  
In conservation we usually assume conflict means human-wildlife conflict, or 
that it refers to conflict within communities over access to resources. To date there are 
a small number of landmark publications that do examine conservation and conflict. 
For example, Ostrom critiqued  +DUGLQ¶V Tragedy of the Commons approach,12 by 
focusing on patterns of cooperation and governance in common property regimes  and 
other important works are provided by Peluso and Watts, Peluso and Vandergeest, 
Ali, Le Billon, Neumann, Conca and Dabelko, and Conca and Wallace).13  
Despite the apparent war for biodiversity there is little research on the links 
between debates about conflict, violence and militarization of conservation. Yet, 
biodiversity conservation is replete with imagery of war and conflict: the rape of the 
Earth, the war on poachers, the fight to save biodiversity and Malthusian visions of 
scarcity. They are used to motivate the public to support conservation organizations in 
their efforts to save, preserve, conserve and protect.14 Furthermore, it draws heavily 
on the language of military intervention, especially the idea of Responsibility to 
Protect, or R2P. Responsibility to Protect centres on an international security and 
KXPDQ ULJKWV QRUP WR DGGUHVV WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\¶V IDLOXUH WR SUHYHQW DQG
stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.15 
Eckersley notes that this raises questions for conservation organizations; she asks 
whether the international community should also be concerned about the massacres 
perpetrated against critically endangered species. Should the international community 
stand by and allow the deliberate killing of the last populations of mountain gorillas 
                                                 
9 Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds) Greed and grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000). 
10 Nils, P. Gleditsch, µ:KLWKHUWKHZHDWKHU"&OLPDWHFKDQJHDQGFRQIOLFW¶Journal of Peace Research, 
49, 2012, pp. 3-9; +DOYDUG%XKDXJµ&OLPDWHQRWWREODPHIRU$IULFDQFLYLOZDUV¶Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 107 (201), pp.16477-16482; Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael 
Watts (eds), Violent environments (Ithaca/London: Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 2001). 
11 Karen Litfin, µ&RQVWUXFWLQJ HQYLURQPHQWDO VHFXULW\ DQG HFRORJLFDO LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH¶, Global 
Governance, 5, 1999, pp. 360-364. 
12 Garrett Hardin, µThe tragedy of the cRPPRQV¶ Science 162, 1968, pp.1243-1248; Elinor Ostrom, 
µBeyond markets and states: Polycentric governance of complex economic systems¶ American 
Economic Review 100, June 2010, pp. 641±672. 
13 Saleem Ali, (2007) (ed) Peace parks: Conservation and conflict resolution (Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press, 2007); Ken &RQFDDQG-HQQLIHU:DOODFHµ(QYLURQPHQWDQGSHDFHEXLOGLQJLQZDU-torn societies: 
Lessons from WKH 81 (QYLURQPHQW 3URJUDPPH¶V H[SHULHQFH ZLWK SRVtconflict aVVHVVPHQW¶, Global 
Governance, 15, 2009, pp.485-504; Ken Conca and Geoffrey D. Dabelko (eds) (2002) Environmental 
Peacemaking (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2002); Philippe Le Billon, Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources 
(London, New York: Hurst and Columbia University Press, 2012); Roderick P. Neumann, Imposing 
Wilderness: Struggles over livelihood and nature preservation in Africa (Berkeley: university of 
California Press, 1998); Peluso and Watts, Violent environments; Nancy Lee Peluso and Peter 
Vandergeest (2011) Political Ecologies of War and Forests: Counterinsurgencies and the Making of 
National Natures, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 101:3, 587-608. 
14 Raymond L. %U\DQW µ%RUQ WR EH Zild? Non-governmental organizations, politics and the 
HQYLURQPHQW¶ Geography Compass, 3, 2009, pp.1540±1558. 
15 http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ (accessed 16.09.13) 
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for example?16 Eckersley poses an important set of philosophical questions, but this 
paper further develops her approach via an interrogation of how such questions can 
shape conservation practice on the ground. As Humphreys and Smith put it, invoking 
notions of force to protect the environment, especially wildlife, is intuitively 
unacceptable for many.17 But if we accept that conservation of other species 
constitutes an international legal duty then (in theory) intervention to prevent these 
crimes by a UN backed force can be defended as a just cause and there is a moral case 
to be made.18  
 
Current Trends 
Two statements reveal an important tension in current conservation debates: 
 
µ6DYHWKH5KLQR+XQWD3RDFKHU¶19 (ProTrack Anti-Poaching Company) 
 
µ,PSURYLQJ WKH SUDFWLFH RI FRQVHUYDWLRQ E\ HQVXULQJ WKDW SDUWLFLSDWLQJ
RUJDQL]DWLRQV LQWHJUDWH KXPDQ ULJKWV LQWR WKHLU ZRUN¶20 (Conservation 
Initiative on Human Rights) 
 
The relationships between conservation and military approaches to anti-poaching are 
changing. This is the combined result of shifts in approach by illegal hunters, 
innovation in technologies of warfare and the discursive production of a major war for 
biodiversity. Conservation agencies ranging from South Africa National Parks 
(SANParks) and Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS) to Save the Rhino International and 
private landowners have highlighted what they see as a rising threat to wildlife from 
well-equipped and well organized poaching gangs, prompting calls for a more 
coordinated approach.21 Proposed solutions include greater use of force, the use of 
private military companies, deployment of remote controlled drones, greater 
engagement of local communities, more efforts to expose corruption, campaigns to 
reduce demand in end-user markets and crackdowns on illegal trading at the global 
scale. As Lunstrum argues, this produces heavily militarized and increasingly 
dangerous landscapes, where state actors, private operators and poachers enter into 
conservation areas (national parks and private reserves) willing to engage in deadly 
force, and what follows is an inevitable cycle of militarization.22  
At the same time a group of international conservation organizations have 
formed the Conservation Initiative on Human Rights (CIHR). Members of CIHR are 
Birdlife International, Conservation International (CI), Fauna & Flora International 
(FFI), International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), The Nature 
                                                 
16 Robyn Eckersley, µ(FRORJLFDO Lntervention: Prospects and lLPLWV¶ Ethics and International 
Affairs, 21(3), 2007, p.293. 
17 Jasper Humphreys and M.L.R. Smith, µ:DUDQG:LOGOLIH7KH&ODXVHZLW]&RQQHFWLRQ¶, International 
Affairs 87 (1), 2011, p.121. 
18 (FNHUVOH\ µEcological Intervention¶ S312; also see Richard Milburn, (2012) Mainstreaming the 
environment into postwar recovery: TKH FDVH IRU µHFRORJLFDO GHYHORSPHQW¶, International Affairs, 88 
(5), 2012, pp.1083-1100. 
19 http://www.protrackapu.co.za (accessed 09.11.13) 
20 https://community.iucn.org/cihr/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 09.11.13) 
21 Rosaleen Duffy, Richard H. Emslie and Michael H. Knight (2013) Rhino poaching: How do we 
respond? Report prepared for UK DfID, Evidence On Demand Report HD087, 2013; Lunstrum, 
µGreen Militarization¶; also see Peluso and VandergeestµPolitical Ecologies of War and Forests¶DQG
Megan Ybarra, µTaming the jungle, saving the Maya Forest: sedimented counterinsurgency practices in 
contemporary Guatemalan conservation¶, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 39:2, 2012, pp.479-502 
22 Lunstrum, µGreen Militarization¶. 
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Conservancy, Wetlands International, Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), and 
Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF). CIHR had a three year programme (2010-2013) 
to promote collaborative learning among member organizations, rights-holders, 
stakeholders and experts to support practical implementation of member 
RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶&RQVHUYDWLRQDQG+XPDQ5LJKWV)UDPHZRUNVWKHDLPZDVWRSURPRWH
dialogue and good practice with regard to human rights in conservation 
initiatives.23 There is a tension in this since the same conservation organizations are 
considering (and in some cases using) greater levels of force and militarized 
approaches to protect wildlife.  For example, in 2012 WWF-International 
FRQJUDWXODWHG WKH 3UHVLGHQW RI &DPHURRQ IRU KLV GHSOR\PHQW RI µspecial forces to 
protect vulnerable areas, people and elephants from heavily armed foreign poaching 
JDQJV¶24 In this statement it is clear that WWF-International are using the argument 
around organised criminality and more heavily armed hunters as a justification for a 
military-style response. However, the increased use of military approaches carries a 
risk that human rights will be compromised in the pursuit anti-poaching initiatives. 
Essentially, it is important to consider who we are protecting wildlife from, what we 
are protecting wildlife for and what methods we deem acceptable.   
The appointment of Major General Johan Jooste (retired) as coordinator for 
Operation Rhino in Kruger National Park in South Africa in 2012 is indicative of 
increasing militarization of conservation. His appointment is linked to a wider 
military strategy, 2SHUDWLRQ&RURQDZKLFKDLPVWRVHFXUH6RXWK$IULFD¶VERUGHUV, and 
the soldiers deployed in Kruger National Park work as a Joint Force with SANParks 
rangers.25 The justification from the South African State is that it needs to address the 
involvement of organized crime, and the fact that poaching gangs are increasingly 
well armed and aggressive. Major General Jooste clearly identifies poaching as a 
declaration of war, linking it to wider regional security issues, such as immigration 
and governance failures.26 Further, 6RXWK$IULFD¶VPDQDJHPHQWSODQ IRUEODFN UKLQR
points to the critical importance of better intelligence systems to prevent poaching, 
rather than relying on prosecutions after a rhino has been killed.27 South Africa now 
offers a cash reward of R100,000 for information which leads to arrest and 
R1,000,000 for successful conviction of the heads of criminal poaching gangs. The 
initiative links in with Crime Line and allows the public to give anonymous 
information via SMS information.28 
This military approach is not confined to South Africa, other rhino range states 
have also increased their security measures. For example, Kenya has also increased its 
anti-poaching efforts in recent years;  ZDVGHFODUHGDVWKHµ\HDURIWKHUKLQR¶WR
                                                 
23 Conservation Initiative on Human Rights (CIHR) 
 https://community.iucn.org/cihr/Pages/WhatWeDo.aspx (accessed 19.11.13). 
24 µ7KH\ DUH DIWHU RXU HOHSKDQWV¶  http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?207115 (accessed 
09.01.13). 
25 Lunstrum, µGreen Militarization¶ 
26 http://www.sanparks.org/about/news/default.php?id=55388 (accessed 03.09.13); Julian Rademeyer, 
Killing for profit: Exposing the illegal rhino horn trade (Cape Town: Zebra Press/Random House 
Struik, 2013), 
27 Michael H. Knight, David Balfour and Richard H. Emslie compilers,  Biodiversity management plan 
for the black rhinoceros (Diceros Bicornis) in South Africa 2011-2020 prepared by South African 
members of the SADC Rhino Management Group (2013) on behalf of Department of Environmental 
Affairs and approved by the South African Minister of Environmental Affairs and Gazetted as a species 
Biodiversity Management Plan under the National Environmental Management and Biodiversity Act 
(NEMBA) p.38; Department of Environmental Affairs, Rhino issue management report (Government 
of South Africa, 2013) p.20. 
28  http://www.sanparks.org/about/news/default.php?id=55388  (09.11.13) 
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direct focus and resources; the Rhino Ranger Force  increased by more than 25% 
during 2011, by converting rhino scouts operating on private land into Kenya Police 
Reservists.29 This shows that rhino range states, in particular, are drawing on military 
techniques to secure rhinos in the longer term.  
Military-style approaches require more thorough interrogation in part because 
conservation agencies are currently grappling with the question of whether to engage 
the services of a growing number of private companies offering conservation 
µHQIRUFHPHQW¶. This reflects wider global changes that have seen the rise in 
outsourcing security and an enhanced role for private military companies. This in turn 
inter-links with wider concerns about a lack of state capacity, especially in wildlife 
protection. Such moves then raise questions around governance, sovereignty and 
authority, since at its most basic, private companies can be contracted to deliver 
military style anti-poaching strategies, which include authorization for the use of 
lethal force. This is an important development, not just because it allows private 
companies to exercise force, the training they offer also imparts certain values and 
ideas.30 These approaches then inform and shape practice in the longer term.  
South Africa is a good example of the challenges raised by a combination of 
endangered species, private reserves, private sector enforcement and weak state 
capacity in the conservation sector. South Africa has built a global reputation for 
privatized conservation, and the area around the Kruger national park, especially 
0DSXWDODQG DQG .ZD]XOX 1DWDO FRQWDLQ D QXPEHU RI µSULYDWH SDUNV¶. These range 
from ranches offering sport hunting, to luxury lodges engaged in traditional 
photographic safaris to luxury safari centres that also offer golf and spas. Private 
UHVHUYHV DUH FULWLFDOO\ LPSRUWDQW SDUW RI 6RXWK $IULFD¶V FRQVHUYDWLRQ HVWDWH One-
TXDUWHU RI 6RXWK $IULFD¶V  Uhinos are found on private land, more than the 
combined population of the rest of Africa.31 6RXWK$IULFD¶Vstate-based conservation 
agencies have supported and expanded the role of private reserves by creating 
financial incentives for stocking rhinos, based on generating revenue from tourism, 
WURSK\KXQWLQJDQGOLYHVDOHV7KLVKDVKHOSHGLQFUHDVHWKHFRXQWU\¶VUKLQRSRSXODWLRQ
by 130% since 1997.32 
Further, there are strong links between the South African military and private 
sector security providers, which facilitate the translation of military approaches and 
techniques to conservation. Following the end of the Cold War and the end of 
apartheid in South Africa, former military personnel began to move into private sector 
security. In South Africa, former soldiers from the apartheid era South African 
Defence Force (SADF) carved out a new niche in conservation. In many ways the 
skills needed by rangers are similar to those possessed by military personnel, 
including survival skills, knowledge of weaponry and the ability to plan operations. 
                                                 
29 KWS, Conservation and management strategy for the black rhino and management guidelines for 
the white rhino in Kenya (2012-2016) (Nairobi: Kenya Wildlife Service, 2012). p.24 
30 Carolyn Nordstrom, (2004) The shadows of war: Violence, power, and international profiteering in 
the twenty-first century (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004). 
31 Michael H. Knight, Richard H. Emslie and R. Smart  compilers (in prep, 2013) Biodiversity 
management plan for the white rhinoceros (Diceros Bicornis) in South Africa 2013-2018 prepared by  
the SADC Rhino Management Group following a multi-stakeholder workshop at the request of the 
South African Minister of the Environment on behalf of Department of Environmental Affairs;  Shirley 
Brooks, Marja Spierenburg, Lot van Brakel, Annemarie Kolk, Kethabakhe B. LuKhozi, µCreating a 
FRPPRGLILHGZLOGHUQHVV7RXULVPSULYDWH JDPH IDUPLQJDQG µWKLUGQDWXUH¶ ODQGVFDSHV LQ.ZD=XOX-
Natal¶, Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geografie, 102(3), 2011, pp.260-274. 
32 Duan Biggs, Frank Courchamp, Rowan Martin, Hugh P. Possingham, µ/HJDO 7UDGH RI $IULFD¶V
5KLQR+RUQV¶Science, 339 (6123), 2013, pp.1038-1039  
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Therefore from the mid-1990s the conservation sector increasingly saw the use of 
private military companies for enforcement.33 Two good examples are EcoRanger and 
Protrack Anti-Poaching Company, the largest of the conservation security companies 
in South Africa.34  
It is important to reflect on how a rise in militarized conservation has been 
justified by NGOs, states and the private sector, In essence, it relies on the argument 
that survival of key species is threatened by a recent and rapid rise in highly organized 
poaching. However, these claims require greater scrutiny. 7KHFXUUHQWµUKLQRZDUV¶LQ
South Africa are an excellent example of how the complexities of poaching are 
subsumed under simplistic messages. The media headlines about a new rhino war, 
waged by highly armed professionalised poachers on the private ranches near Kruger 
Park, are misleading. Poaching rates are lower than birth rates, so rhino numbers 
continue to rise. However, poaching at a continental level has increased significantly 
since 2007-8; and if this trend continues the tipping point (where deaths start to 
exceed births) and rhino numbers start declining could be reached by 2015.35 
Poaching data for South Africa indicates that the major problem is faced by Kruger 
National Park and that poachers are likely to be crossing the border from 
Mozambique; these are not hi-tech armed gangs with helicopters but individuals 
drawn in to a complex global trade for economic reasons.36  In the midst of media 
headlines about the rises in rhino poaching, little attention is paid to the number of 
people killed in an increasingly lethal conflict; between 2008 and 2013, 300 suspected 
poachers have been killed in Kruger National Park alone. As Lunstrum notes, the area 
has been marked by an arms race between poachers, soldiers and rangers, with each 
group using more and more sophisticated weaponry. Thus far no rangers or soldiers 
have been killed, but for those working in the park it is accepted that it is only a 
matter of time.37 It is important to note here that the effect of rhino poaching is much 
wider that the act of hunting and killing the rhino itself ± there are very clear human 
costs that are often rendered invisible in the headlines. Nevertheless, the argument 
that there is a new threat remains an important justification for militarization. 
The headlines about poaching also mask the complex networks of corruption 
that poaching and trading rely on to function. For example, there is strong evidence of 
collusion by ranch owners and by vets, because the value of live rhinos has dropped. 
Meanwhile the black market price for rhino horn has risen. Therefore there is an 
HFRQRPLF LQFHQWLYH IRU UDQFK RZQHUV WR µDOORZ¶ WKHLU UKLQRV WR EH SRDFKHG WDNH D
portion of the profits from sale of the horn and then buy another live rhino at auction 
via the Kwazulu-Natal (KZN) parks service.38 )XUWKHUPRUH 6RXWK $IULFD¶V
Threatened or Protected Species Regulations (TOPS) which falls under the National 
Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act of 2004,39 created a fear in emerging 
markets in Vietnam and Thailand that the supply of rhino horn would soon dry up. 
This prompted a more aggressive approach toward poaching. Finally, there are clear 
                                                 
33 Duffy, Emslie, Knight, µRhino poaching¶p.15. 
34 http://www.protrackapu.co.za/; http://www.iapf.org/en/; (accessed 05.11.13) 
http://www.ecoranger.co.za/. (accessed 06.11.13). 
35 Sarah Standley and Richard H. Emslie (2013) Population and poaching of African rhinos across 
African range States 2007-2012, Consultancy Report for DfID, August 2013. Evidence on Demand 
Report (no. HD078) EDVHGRQILJXUHVVXSSOLHGE\,8&1¶V$I56*DQG75$)),& 
36 Duffy, Emslie and Knight, µRhino poaching¶p.8 
37 LuQVWUXPµGreen Militarization¶ 
38 http://www.rhinoconservation.org/2012/02/10/rhino-crimes-are-the-right-people-going-to-jail/ 
(accessed 06.11.13). 
39 http://www.speciesstatus.sanbi.org/pdf/a10-04.pdf (accessed 06.11.13). 
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links to wider forms of organized crime. Pseudo hunting was a problem in South 
Africa until relatively recently, and the practice supplied a significant amount of horn 
to illegal markets.40  A Government clamp down on issuing rhino hunting permits has 
largely solved this problem.41 The recent conviction of Thai businessman Chumlong 
Lemtongthai demonstrates these complexities very well. He used prostitutes to pose 
as big game hunters on private reserves. The professional hunting operation possessed 
the legal hunting permit, and then the women were asked to pose in front of the rhinos 
with a weapon as a photographic trophy. The genuine permit could then be copied and 
presented with the photographic evidence to indicate that the rhino horn was being 
exported legally as a hunting trophy.42 Calls to engage in more aggressive and 
militarized anti-poaching to protect rhinos fail to engage adequately with these 
dynamics and are based on simplified and outdated understandings of what drives 
illegal hunting in the first place. 
The militarization of anti-poaching is also reflected in the use of new 
technologies or the deployment of existing technologies in new ways. These include 
the use of UAVs (drones), camera traps, thermal imaging and GPS trackers for 
rangers to aid the anti-poaching efforts. There is increasing interest in using drones 
and camera traps for conservation law enforcement, especially as park rangers 
currently have to patrol large areas.43 Protected areas in Kenya, Namibia and South 
Africa have started using drones for surveillance as part of anti-poaching efforts.44 For 
example, the MET in Namibia has concluded that strategic deployment of such new 
technologies, coupled with increases in staff capacity and regional co-operation will 
lead to quicker detection of incursions.45  Google recently granted more than US$5 
million to WWF to develop approaches for using drones and camera traps for poacher 
detection; this was part of Google's Global Impact Awards, which has a fund of 
US$23 million to develop tech uptake in areas including conservation and 
humanitarianism.46 Zoological Society of London (ZSL) is also part of a group 
(along-side WWF, WCS, Frankfurt Zoological Society; Columbia Zoo and CITES 
and MIKE) working on developing a Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool 
(SMART) and use of camera traps and other surveillance technologies to increase 
coverage.47  However, in the rush to try out new technologies there is a need to 
carefully think through whether they will be accepted by local communities; for 
                                                 
40 Richard H. Emslie, Tom Milliken, Bibhab Talukdar, (2012) African and Asian Rhinoceroses ± 
Status, conservation and trade, A report from the IUCN Species Survival Commission (IUCN/SSC) 
African and Asian Rhino Specialist Groups and TRAFFIC to the CITES Secretariat, pursuant to 
Resolution Conf. 9.14 (Rev. CoP15), CoP16 Doc. 54.2-rev 1; Knight, Emslie and Smart, Biodiversity 
management plan. 
41 Tom Milliken and Jo Shaw, The South Africa±Viet Nam rhino horn trade nexus: A deadly 
combination of institutional lapses, corrupt wildlife industry professionals and Asian crime syndicates.  
(Johannesburg: TRAFFIC, 2012) p.52.  
42http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14114327; (accessed 06.11.13). 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/403466/20121109/rhino-poaching-longest-sentence-wwf-south-
africa.htm (accessed 06.11.13). 
43 Emma Marris, µ'URQHV LQ VFLHQFH)O\DQGEULQJPHGDWD¶ Nature 498, 2013, pp.156-158; Karen 
$QGHUVRQDQG.HYLQ*DVWRQµ/LJKWZHight Unmanned Aerial Vehicles will revolutionise spatial 
eFRORJ\¶, Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 11, 2013, pp.138±146, 
44 Pierre du Preez, Black rhino conservation in Namibia (confidential draft report) (Windhoek: Ministry 
of Environment and Tourism, 2013); pers comm Ben Okita.  
45 Du Preez, Black rhino conservation in Namibia. 
46 'HYLQ &ROGHZH\ µ3UHGDWRU EHFRPHV Srey: Google funded drones to hunt poachers in Africa 
http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/predator-becomes-prey-google-funded-drones-hunt-poachers-
africa-1C7456194 (accessed 03.09.13). 
47 Pers comm, ZSL.  
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example it was recently reported in Malta that a drone was shot down because it was 
used to enforce unpopular conservation legislation.48 Those experienced in anti-
poaching acknowledge that while technology can help it is not a substitute for the 
basics such as having a sufficient density of well trained, equipped and well looked 
after motivated field rangers.49  The critical need for minimum densities of staff 
engaged in anti-poaching has been recognized for some time.50 Such new 
technologies still require personnel on the ground to make them effective, a problem 
which is well documented in the case of technological approaches to warfare.51 
It is important to consider whether a more militarized approach will be 
effective or not, especially where risk of detection and punishment are low. It is 
DVVXPHGWKDWLQFUHDVLQJWKHµULVNV¶ZKHQFRPSDUHGZLWKUHZDUGVZLOOUHGXFHSRDFKLQJ
overall.52 7¶6DV5ROIHVVXJJHVWV that if the cumulative probability of being detected, 
arrested, convicted and punished is perceived to be low, even potentially harsh 
sentences will be disregarded.53 Du Toit points out that an increase in jail sentences 
and financial penalties reduced oppoUWXQLVWSRDFKLQJ=LPEDEZH¶VORZYHOGEXWDKDUG
core of professional, well equipped commercial poachers remained.54 Furthermore, 
heavy handed anti-poaching tactics will in fact be counter-productive in the longer 
term.55 This concern is clearly stated in the *RYHUQPHQWRI1DPLELD¶VManagement 
Plan for White Rhino which notes that draconian penalties result in undesirable 
                                                 
48 Times of Malta < http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20120830/local/cabs-sending-32-bird-
guards-to-malta.434991 > (accessed 24.07.13) 
49 Du Preez, Black rhino conservation in Namibia; pers comm Ben Okita. 
50 Richard H. Emslie and Martin Brooks (1999) African rhino, status survey and action plan, 
IUCN/SSC African Rhino Specialist Group (Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge UK: IUCN, 1999); 
Richard H. Emslie Rajan Amin and Richard Kock, Guidelines for the in situ re-introduction and 
translocation of African and Asian Rhinoceros ± First edition 2009, Occasional paper of the IUCN 
Species Survival Commission Number 39, 2009. 
51 3DXO5RJHUVµ6HFXULW\E\UHPRWHFRQWURO&DQLWZRUN"¶, The RUSI Journal, 158 (3), 2013, pp.14-20. 
52 Raoul du Toit, µ'ULYHUV RI 5KLQR 3RDFKLQJ¶ presentation at IUCN-SSC African Rhino Specialist 
Group Meeting, Mokala, South Africa, March 2011  
53 W¶ 6DV 5ROIHV 0  The Rhino Poaching Crisis http://www.rhino-economics.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/The-Rhino-Poaching-Crisis-by-Michael-t-Sas-Rolfes-Final.pdf. p.3; for 
further discussion see Emslie, Milliken, and Talukdar, African and Asian Rhinoceroses; E.J. Milner-
Gulland and Nigel Leader-Williams, A model of incentives for the illegal exploitation of black rhinos 
and elephants; poaching pays in Luangwa Valley, Zambia. Journal of Applied Ecology 29, 1992, 
pp.388-401; Freya A.V. St. John, Aiden Keane and E.J. Milner-*XOODQG µEffective conservation 
depends upon understanding human behaviour, in David W. MacDonald and Kathy Willis (eds) Key 
Topics in Conservation Biology 2 (West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) pp. 344-361; Ostrom, 
µBeyond Markets and States¶. 
54 Raoul du Toit, µ5HVSRQVHWRUKLQRSRDFKLQJLQ=LPEDEZH¶V/RZYHOG5HJLRQ¶, Presentation at IUCN-
SSC African Rhino Specialist Group Meeting, Naro Moru, Kenya, February 2013;  Duffy, Emslie and 
.QLJKWµ5KLQRSRDFKLQJ¶p.12. 
55 Dilys Roe et al, Conservation and human rights: the need for international standards. Policy 
Briefing (London: IIED, 2010); Bilal Butt, µ&RPPRGLWL]LQJ WKHVDIDULDQGPDNLQJVSDFHIRUFRQIOLFW
3ODFH LGHQWLW\ DQG SDUNV LQ (DVW $IULFD¶, Political Geography 31, 2012, pp.104-113; Elizabeth 
/XQVWUXP µ$UWLFXODWHG VRYHUHLJQW\([WHQGLQJ0R]DPELFDQ VWDWH SRZHU WKURXJK WKH *reat Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park¶, Political Geography, 36, 2013, pp.1-11; Roderick P. Neumann, µ0RUDO DQG
GLVFXUVLYHJHRJUDSKLHVLQWKHZDUIRUELRGLYHUVLW\LQ$IULFD¶Political Geography, 23, 2004, pp.813±
37; Nancy Lee Peluso, µ&RHUFLQJ FRQVHUYDWLRQ" 7KH SROLWLFV RI VWDWH UHVRXUFH FRQWURO¶ Global 
Environmental Change, 3(2), 1993, pp.199±218; Wolfram Dressler, Bram Bscher, Michael Schoon, 
Daniel Brockington, Tanya Hayes, Christian Kull, James McCarthy, and .ULVKQD6WUHVKWDµ)URPKRSH
to crisis and back? A critical history of the global CBNRM narrative¶ Environment al Conservation, 
37(1), 2010, pp.1-11. 
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sociological outcomes.56 In order to design more effective responses to illegal 
hunting, we need to understanding its origins, the PRWLYDWLRQVRI µSRDFKHUV¶DQG WKH
ways poaching intersects with wider regional and global dynamics. The complex 
question of how hunting was reconfigured and redefined as poaching is the subject of 
the next section.  
 
Defining Poaching 
A key question is how we define poaching because such definitions shape approaches 
to control it. Poaching can be defined as hunting of any animal not permitted by the 
state or private owner.  Such activities are often referred to as illegal hunting or 
poaching, but a more accurate description is extra-legal hunting: hunting that occurs 
outside the boundaries of legal frameworks. Using the terminology of extra-legal 
hunting removes the negative and criminalizing connotations of the words illegal or 
poaching. Nevertheless, the historically informed definitions of poaching still persist. 
Neumann¶V ODQGPDUN SLHFH RQ WKH PRUDO DQG GLVFXUVLYH JHRJUDSKLHV RI WKH ZDU IRU
biodiversity advanced our understandings of the wider implications of such 
definitions; in essence they indicate a deep seated fear of the poor and their claims in 
resources, tapping in to Malthusian interpretations which encourage conservation 
agencies to view poor people as the enemy.57 Poaching has been produced as a 
category by a process of enclosure and criminalization which then intersects with a 
range of motivations: subsistence, financial gain, resistance to wildlife protection 
laws, even as a military strategy. It involves creating the idea of an omnipresent, 
secretive and criminal enemy, such an enemy is difficult, if not impossible to tackle, 
and yet it shapes and defines practice on the ground, narrowing the policy options 
towards military style anti-poaching. 
Since we need to understand the origins of the war for biodiversity, it is 
important to understand the KLVWRULFDOFUHDWLRQRIWKHFDWHJRU\µSRDFKHU¶. This exposes 
the assumptions that are rendered invisible in calls for a more forceful and military 
approach towards conservation. As Neumann notes, war is a common model for 
biodiversity protection in Africa, where protected areas become spaces of violence in 
which human rights abuses and use of deadly violence against humans in defence of 
wildlife have become normalised.58 This model of war for conservation is in part a 
result of longer term historical developments. Colonial authorities often outlawed 
hunting with the use of snares and traps, which effectively criminalized the 
subsistence hunting practices of local communities.59 In British colonies this drew on 
the much longer historical process of the developing the Game Laws that 
systematically removed the hunting rights of poorer communities. As Perelman 
DUJXHV µRYHU WLPH WKH *DPH /DZV UHIOHFWHG DQ HPHUJLQJ KHJHPRQ\ RI SURSHUW\
relations in which the interests of capital and the gentry coincided. The gentry could 
                                                 
56 Ministry of Environment and Tourism, Species management plan: White rhinoceros (Windhoek: 
Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 2012) p.8. 
57 Neumann, µ0RUDODQGGLVFXUVLYHJHRJUDSKLHV¶S816-822. 
58 Neumann, µ0RUDODQGGLVFXUVLYHJHRJUDSKLHV¶S813; Peluso and Vandergeest, µPolitical Ecologies 
of War and Forests¶ 
59 Duffy, Nature Crime; Neumann, µ0RUDODQGGLVFXUVLYHJHRJUDSKLHV¶; Karl Jacoby, Crimes against 
nature: Squatters, poachers, thieves, and the hidden history of American conservation (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2003); Jane Carruthers, The Kruger National Park: A social and 
political history (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1995); John M. MacKenzie, Empire of 
nature: Hunting conservation and British imperialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1988); Bill Adams, Against extinction: The story of conservation (London: Earthscan, 2004) pp.19-24. 
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enjoy the prestige of hunting, while the capitalists could profit from the labour of 
people who were forbidden to hunt as a means of VXEVLVWHQFH¶.60  
European sport hunters were also portrayed as caring about conservation and 
the reducing the suffering of individual animals; in contrast, African hunting methods 
that relied on traps and snares were redefined as cruel and unsporting. The 
characterizations of hunters versus poachers also linked in to racial stereotypes of the 
day. Representations of African men as cruel poachers neatly intersected with 
European/imperial fears of Africans as savage, uncivilized and barbaric. Neumann 
This dynamics of humanising animals and dehumanising people means that deadly 
violence is normalised. 61 Colonial expansion was initially underpinned by the search 
for lucrative goods including gold, ivory and slaves. MacKenzie details how hunting 
for game assisted and subsidized British imperial expansion in Africa in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.62 In the early part of the twentieth century 
hunting expeditions by high-profile figures, such as Theodore Roosevelt, served to 
bring the idea of the safari to international attention in the early 1900s.63  These 
developments cemented the idea of African poaching versus European sportsmanship, 
ZKLFK UHPDLQV GLVFHUQLEOH LQ MXVWLILFDWLRQV IRU D PLOLWDU\ UHVSRQVH WR µFULPLQDO¶
poaching gangs. 
These historical dynamics have led to simplistic understandings that are reflected in 
the two main definitions of poaching.  Subsistence poaching is commonly thought of 
DV µKXQWLQJ IRU WKHSRW¶. It relies on different technologies such as traps and snares, 
because the target is small game, such as antelope.64 By contrast, commercial 
poachers typically operate within organized groups that target financially valuable 
species, such as rhinos and elephants. Commercial poachers may use different 
technologies to hunt, including firearms, GPS and mobile phones.65  
Recently some subsistence poaching with snares has changed so that it is now 
more difficult to distinguish it from commercial-scale poaching. Small-scale 
subsistence hunting has been transformed by the demands of a global market for meat, 
tropical timber and key minerals. Redford FRLQHG WKH SKUDVH µHPSW\ IRUHVWV¶ WR
indicate how commercial hunting depletes forests of fauna, which has a knock-on 
effect on local access to small game as sources of protein.66 The growth of the bush 
meat trade in Central and West Africa is linked to the extension of logging and 
mining into remote areas of rainforest. The mines and logging camps require 
development of roads to transport timber and minerals to urban centres and 
international markets, which facilitates transport of bush meat to urban markets. 
Therefore the definitions of different kinds of poaching are blurred at the boundaries, 
which is not reflected in calls for greater use of force and military techniques to 
µFRPEDW¶SRDFKLQJ  
                                                 
60 0DUFXV 3HUHOPDQ µ3ULPLWLYH DFFXPXODWLRQ IURP IHXGDOLVP WR QHROLEHUDOLVP¶ Capitalism Nature 
Socialism, 18(2), 2007, pp.53.  
61 Neumann, µ0RUDO DQG GLVFXUVLYH JHRJUDSKLHV¶ S825; for similar debates on North America see 
Jacoby, Crimes against nature. 
62 MacKenzie, Empire of nature. 
63 Neumann, µ0RUDODQGGLVFXUVLYHJHRJUDSKLHV¶S$GDPV Against extinction, pp.331-341. 
64 MacKenzie, Empire of nature; Adams, Against extinction.  
65 Duffy, Nature Crime, pp.79-119; Richard Leakey, Wildlife wars: My battle to sDYH .HQ\D¶V 
Elephants (London: Pan, 2001); Daniel Brockington, Rosaleen Duffy and James Igoe, Nature unbound: 
Conservation, capitalism and the future of protected areas (London: Earthscan, 2008) pp.77-78; 
Leakey, Wildlife wars. 
66 .HQW5HGIRUGµ7KH(PSW\)RUHVW¶American Institute of Biological Sciences, 42(6), 1992, pp.412-
422. 
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It is also important to place poaching in a wider political context; this in turn 
helps us understand what produces poaching and how to design effective responses to 
it. The 1970s and 1980s saw the development of large-scale ivory poaching to satisfy 
demand in Europe, North America and growing markets in China and Japan. Prior to 
the ivory trade ban in 1989, the legal supply could not meet rising demand, which was 
met with illegally obtained ivory. The demand became so great that poaching halved 
$IULFD¶VHOHSKDQWSRSulation in twenty years, populations in Africa from 1.3 million 
to just 600,000; Kenya had 65,000 elephants in 1979, but only 17,000 were left in 
1989.67 
In 1988 the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) identified economic motivations as 
the source of poaching.68 They presented a clear message that elephants could be 
saved with effective anti-poaching patrols. This was a message that the general public, 
international donors and conservation NGOs could get behind and support. However, 
it is clear that large-scale poaching as witnessed in East Africa in the 1980s or parts of 
Southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s could not possibly have been carried out 
without corruption and complicity at the highest levels of government.69 This is 
discussed further below.  
The levels of involvement of the SADF in poaching and trafficking were 
clearly exposed and detailed in the report of the Kumleben Commission. In 1995 Mr 
Justice Kumleben was appointed to head a commission of enquiry into the role SADF 
in poaching and trafficking. The report detailed how the SADF (in the apartheid era) 
used ivory, rhino horn, hardwoods and drugs to fund its wars and destabilization 
campaigns in South West Africa (now Namibia), Angola and Mozambique.70 The 
Kumleben Commission found that the SADF used these sales to finance numerous 
rebel groups, and that the Military Intelligence Department was heavily involved in 
the sale of elephant tusks from Angola between 1978 and 1986.71 According to a 
high-ranking South African military officer, Colonel Jan Breytenbach, certain 
elements in the Chief of Staff (Intelligence) had used a front company, Frama Inter-
Trading, to clandestinely export teak, ivory, gems and drugs from Angola, and with 
the aim of financing UNITA and SADF operations.72 As with the current rhino wars 
in South Africa, when we examine poaching in more detail, a much more complex 
picture emerges that cannot be easily tackled with small teams of more heavily armed 
rangers.  
The case of Southern Africa in the 1980s is not the only example of the 
complex and often fraught linkages between conflict and poaching. Poaching has been 
used as a financial underpinning for conflicts across Sub-Saharan Africa, including 
                                                 
67 Duffy, Nature Crime, p.4. 
68 Raymond Bonner, $W WKH KDQG RI PDQ 3HULO DQG KRSH IRU $IULFD¶V Zildlife (London: Simon and 
Schuster, 1993) p.54. 
69 Roz Reeve and Stephen Ellis, µ$QLQVLGHU¶VDFFRXQWRIWKH6RXWK$IULFDQVHFXULW\IRUFH¶VUROHLQWKH
LYRU\WUDGH¶Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 13, 1995, pp.222±243. 
70 M.E. Kumleben, (1996) Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the alleged smuggling of and 
illegal Trade in ivory and rhinoceros horn in South Africa (Durban, South Africa, 1996); Reeve and 
(OOLVµ$QLQVLGHU¶V DFFRXQW¶; 6WHSKHQ(OOLVµ2IHOHSKDQWVDQGPHQ3ROLWLFVDQGQDWXUHFonservation in 
South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies 20, 1994, pp.53-69. 
71 µ5HSRUWWDNHV::)WR³7XVN´¶ Mail and Guardian, 19.1.96; Kumleben, Report of the Commission 
of Enquiry. 
72 µ6$ $UP\¶V LYRU\ WUDLO H[SRVHG¶, Independent (UK), 23.3.92; Reeve and Ellis, µ$Q LQVLGHU¶V
accounW¶; Rosaleen Duffy, µ7KH UROH DQG OLPLWDWLRQV RI VWDWH FRHUFLRQ DQWL-poaching policies in 
=LPEDEZH¶Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 17, 1999, pp.97±121; Kumleben, Report of the 
Commission of Enquiry, pp.206-210. 
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Uganda in the 1970s and 1980s,73 Angola and Mozambique in the 1980s,74 and the 
Great Lakes region since 1996.75 The rise in poaching in Central African Republic 
and its relationships to regional security issues (Chad, Cameroon, CAR and Gabon) 
was detailed in a report by UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon.76  Zakouma National 
Park in Chad has also suffered poaching by rebel groups to fund cross border wars; 
*DUDPED 1DWLRQDO 3DUN '5& ZDV XVHG DV D EDVH E\ WKH /RUG¶V 5HVLVWDQFH $UP\
(LRA) in 2012 and it used ivory poaching to underpin and finance operations; leader 
of the LRA, Joseph Kony, was based there in 2012.77 However, the claim that new 
ivory wars are organized by Janjaweed militia and LRA has been seriously questioned 
± /RPEDUGVXJJHVWVWKHVHDUHVLPSOLVWLFDQGµHDV\ODEHOV¶XVHGE\*RYHUQPHQWVLQWKH
region to entice in external help or to demonizHSRDFKHUVDVµRXWVLGHUV¶78 This process 
of categorizing poachers as criminals or rebel groups fixes poachers as a specific type 
of individual that constitutes a threat to wildlife, and is used to justify militarized 
responses so that poachers, rangers and linked military personnel becoming 
increasingly locked into the use of lethal force. Furthermore, it risks placing rangers 
in the position of being protagonists and perpetrators of some of $IULFD¶V PRVW
complex regional conflicts. In that sense anti-poaching and conservation actually rely 
more fully on the production of regional stability than on militarized approaches to 
conservation. 
 
The development of militarized anti-poaching 
Militarized forms of anti-poaching are not new, for example, early game wardens in 
British colonial administrations were often ex-military personnel.79 However, the 
purpose here is to explain how current approaches developed and began to displace 
the participatory approaches that characterised the 1990s.80 Somewhat paradoxically, 
as CBNRM approaches were on the rise, so were various forms of militarization of 
conservation in response to specific problems, notably ivory poaching. Since the 
                                                 
73 /LQGD 1RUJURYH DQG 'DYLG +XOPH µ&RQIURQWLQJ FRQVHUYDWLRQ DW 0RXQW (OJRQ 8JDQGD¶, 
Development and Change, 37(5), 2006, pp.1093-1116. 
74 Reeve and Ellis, µ$Q LQVLGHU¶V DFFRXQW¶; Ellis µOf elephants and men; Duffy, µ7KH UROH DQG
limitations of state coercion¶ 
75 For further discussion of the links between wildlife and conflict see Sophia Benz and Judith Benz-
6FKZDU]EXUJµ*UHDWDSHVDQGQHZZDUV¶Civil Wars 12(4), 2011, pp.395-430; Duffy, Nature Crime, 
pp.113-174; +XPSKUH\VDQG6PLWKµ:DUDQGZildlife¶. 
76 United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the activities of the United Nations Regional 
2IILFH IRU&HQWUDO$IULFDDQGRQ WKH/RUG¶V5HVLVWDQFH$UP\DIIHFWHGDUHDV (New York: UN, 2013). 
Report reference S/2013/297. 
77 United Nations, Report of the Secretary General.  http://www.african-parks.org/; 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/world/africa/kony-elephant-poaching; Brian Christy, µ%ORRG ,YRU\¶
National Geographic, October 2012; Keith Somerville, African Arguments Series (Royal African 
Society) Ivory Wars: How poaching in Central Africa fuels the LRA and Janjaweed, 14.01.13, 
http://africanarguments.org/2013/01/14/the-ivory-wars-how-poaching-in-central-africa-fuels-the-lra-
and-janjaweed-%E2%80%93-by-keith-somerville/ 
78 Louisa Lombard, µ,YRU\:DUV¶New York Times /RXLVD/RPEDUGµThe tangled brokering 
of militarized conservation in Central Africa¶, paper presented at the American Anthropological 
Association, San Francisco, November 2012. 
79 Neumann, µ0RUDODQGGLVFXUVLYHJHRJUDSKLHV¶S 828. 
80 For further discussion see Jeanette Manjengwa and Simon  Anstey (eds) Beyond proprietorship: 
0XUSKUHH¶V ODZV RQ community-based natural resource management in Southern Africa (Harare: 
Weaver Press/Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2009); James C. Murombedzi, 
 µ:K\ ZLOGOLIHFRQVHUYDWLRQKDVQRWHFRQRPLFDOO\EHQHILWHGFRPPXQLWLHV LQ$IULFD¶ LQ'DYLG
Hulme and Marshall Murphree (eds) African Wildlife and Livelihoods (Oxford: James Currey), pp. 
208±26; Neumann, Imposing Wilderness; Vupenyu Dzingirai, µ7KH QHZ VFUDPEOH IRU WKH $IULFDQ
FRXQWU\VLGH¶Development and Change 34(2), 2003, pp.243-263. 
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1980s conservation practice has been progressively militarized following high-profile 
ivory and rhino wars in East Africa. For example in 1988 President Moi in Kenya 
gave permission for the Kenya Wildlife Service to use a shoot-on-sight policy against 
suspected poachers; in 1987 President Mugabe in Zimbabwe declared a war on rhino 
poachers and gave authorization for the Parks Department to engage in a shoot-to±kill 
policy; and in Tanzania Operation Uhai in 1989 was used to sweep all parks and 
neighbouring communities of suspected poachers. The shoot-to-kill approach was not 
confined to the 1980s: parks agencies still use deadly force for conservation purposes, 
with or without state authorization. For example, in just two years (1998±2000) parks 
staff in Malawi, who had been trained by South African mercenaries, were implicated 
in 300 murders, 325 disappearances, 250 rapes and numerous instances of torture and 
intimidation in the Liwonde National Park alone.81  
Conservation agencies and supporters of military style conservation point to 
the need for shoot-to-kill because rangers encounter heavily armed poachers during 
their patrols; it is argued that rangers must be able to defend themselves against such 
groups. However, while the justifications for shoot-to-kill are largely premised on the 
idea of allowing rangers to react and defend themselves, the use of shoot-to-kill is 
often a much more active and preventative approach. Referring back to Zimbabwe in 
the early 1990s, rangers were encouraged to shoot on sight, which is not a reactive 
strategy. This raises questions around the use of pre-emption and the assumption that 
anyone found in a privately owned or state protected area is potentially engaged in 
criminal behaviour. Furthermore, narrowing the scope of discussion to how rangers 
respond to an immediate armed threat allows supporters to justify militarized 
approaches. Essentially the question becomes how do rangers respond to an 
immediate attack? instead of what is the most effective way to tackle poaching? Such 
reductive approaches justify and legitimate a military response via appeals to self-
defence.  
 
Conclusion  
There is an increasing interest in, and use of, militarized approaches to anti-poaching. 
It is a response to the apparent development of a renewed poaching war, waged 
against rhinos and elephants, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Conservationists, as 
well as various news media, have been sounding the alarm about the threats to these 
species, with claims that poaching has the capacity to drive them to extinction unless 
poachers are tackled with some urgency and greater use of force. The new war for 
biodiversity mirrors the language of interventionism: to return to the point made by 
Eckersley, that the international community has a responsibility towards wildlife, 
especially endangered species, and that may require military forms of intervention to 
save them.82 However, this raises a tension for conservationists: such approaches are a 
justification for repressive, coercive and violent policies, which lead to socially unjust 
outcomes. The faith in new technologies, such as UAVs/drones, camera trapping and 
micro-chipping contribute to the overall militarized approach to the war for 
biodiversity, further embedding a sense that military style technologies can assist in 
the fight against poachers. However, it is clear that these will not be effective without 
the right level of trained and equipped personnel on the ground. The use of such 
technologies can contribute to a negative relationship between communities and 
conservation agencies if they are deployed without proper consultation and consent. 
                                                 
81 Neumann, µ0RUDODQGGLVFXUVLYHJHRJUDSKLHV¶S830. 
82 See Eckersley, µ(FRORJLFDO,QWHUYHQWLRQ¶. 
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Further, such approaches can be entirely counterproductive, alienating the very 
communities conservationists rely on to conserve wildlife because of the use of heavy 
handed tactics.  Local communities are much less likely to support conservation 
efforts, reject attempts to recruit them to poaching rings or provide surveillance and 
intelligence.  
However, there is a more fundamental question that we need to ask: what 
produces poaching? Poaching in Sub-Saharan Africa needs to be seen in wider 
context. First it is linked a wider global system of trading that involves elephants of 
organized crime, collusion and corruption in the public and private sector, the 
involvement of militaries in large scale poaching and the recognition that demand in 
end-user markets ultimately drives poaching in the supply side. Secondly, we also 
need to be aware of the historical background and the ways that certain methods of 
hunting were progressively criminalized by Colonial administrations. This had the 
effect of converting hunting by African communities into an illegal activity that could 
be punished (via fines, incarceration and even death in shoot-to-kill operations) while 
simultaneously protecting the rights of European sport hunters. This in part explains 
why some communities continue to engage in extra-legal forms of hunting, resisting 
WKHZD\VJRYHUQPHQWVRUSULYDWHODQGRZQHUVWU\WRµSURWHFW¶ZLOGOLIH,Wis important 
that conservation agencies are clear about what they are protecting, who they are 
protecting it for and why they are enforcing conservation on the ground. It is often not 
the case that conservationists are protecting important populations of critically 
endangered species. Militarized protection efforts for rhinos and elephants are also 
deployed to protect species that are financially important (as photographic tourist 
attractions or as sport hunting trophies). This is part of the explanation for why 
militarized approaches often fail, they do not resolve the underlying reasons why 
people poach in the first place; they also do not tackle the role of global trading 
networks, nor the continued demand in end-user markets. In the end, they result in 
coercive, unjust and counter-productive approaches to wildlife conservation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
